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89 
GUARDING INTERNATIONAL 
BORDERS AGAINST HIV: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY IN 
FUTILITY 
Matthew J. DeFazio 
ABSTRACT 
Back in 1985, when knowledge of HIV began to spread, 
governments reacted by passing immigration laws to restrict 
the entry of HIV positive individuals.  These laws required 
such individuals to either declare their HIV status or undergo 
mandatory HIV testing to secure entry.  As justification for 
these initiatives, many countries claimed to be preserving the 
public health and their domestic economy.  The United States, 
China, and Russia are three countries that have had, or still 
have, some form of HIV immigration restrictions.  Initially, it 
may seem logical that preventing HIV positive individuals from 
entering a country will cut down on the spread of HIV and save 
the economy from health care costs.  Nevertheless, an analysis 
of the HIV travel restrictions of these three countries will show 
that the public health and economic reasoning behind such 
laws is flawed because HIV is not spread by casual contact and 
because economic goals can be accomplished with less restric-
tive means.  Moreover, this article will further reveal that HIV 
travel restrictions contribute to several health concerns and 
create issues with confidentially and stigmatization. 
In the end, a comparative analysis of these three countries, 
with specific attention paid to their successes and failures, re-
veals that the best system is one that works on both an inter-
national and domestic level.  On the international level, border 
                                               
 Articles Editor, Pace International Law Review, 2012-2013; J.D. Candi-
date, Pace University School of Law (expected May 2013). Special thanks to 
the 2011-2012 and the 2012-2013 editorial boards, as well as the articles 
groups that aided in preparing this article for publication.   
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testing must be voluntary, confidential, and informed.  It 
should also utilize pre and post test counseling, and not be used 
to restrict entry.  On the domestic level, individual countries 
need to educate the public and create programs to address 
high-risk groups responsible for the rapid spread of HIV.  In 
doing so, society will find not only that it is more effectively 
protecting itself from the spread of HIV, but also that it is pro-
tecting the HIV community from the stigma and discrimination 
that contributed to the rapid spread of HIV in the first place.  
I.  INTRODUCTION   
Back in 1985, when knowledge of HIV began to spread,1 
the typical government reaction, as with many diseases, in-
cluded panic and exaggerated response.2  Globally, govern-
ments began passing immigration laws to restrict HIV positive 
individuals from entering their country’s borders by requiring 
them to declare their HIV status or undergo mandatory HIV 
testing to secure entry.3  Overall, four different types of laws 
were implemented: those that completely restricted entry, 
those that prevented short-term entry, those that prevented 
long-term stays, and those that required foreigners who con-
tracted HIV within a country to be deported.4  At the time, 
countries justified these restrictions by stressing public health 
concerns.5 
However, in as early as 1987, World Health Organization 
studies confirmed HIV travel restrictions were overly intrusive 
and ineffective at preserving public health.6  Moreover, since 
                                               
1 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, UNAIDS/IOM STATEMENT 
ON HIV/AIDS-RELATED TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS 3 (2004).  
2  See Jeffrey V. Lazarus et al., HIV-Related Restrictions on Entry, Resi-
dence, and Stay in the WHO European Region: A Survey, 13 J. INT’L AIDS 
SOC’Y, Jan. 10, 2010, at 1-2. 
3 Id. at 2-3. 
4 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
5 Id. 
6 Joseph J. Amon & Katherine W. Todrys, Fear of Foreigners: HIV-
Related Restrictions on Entry, Stay, and Residence, 11 INT’L AIDS SOC’Y, Dec. 
16, 2008, at 2. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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1987, further studies by groups such as the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights concluded that HIV 
travel restrictions were ineffective.7  Nevertheless, as of 2011 
over sixty countries still had some sort of travel ban.8 
Under international law, such as the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), countries have 
broad powers in determining who can enter and stay within 
their borders; however, these powers can be limited if unequal-
ly applied.9  International law stresses that when human rights 
restrictions are placed on specific groups, governments need le-
gitimate reasons for violating equal protection, and they need 
to use the least restrictive means in limiting those rights.10  
Since international laws only apply once a person is within the 
country’s borders,11 this line of reasoning is only useful after 
foreigners have legally or illegally entered and are then at risk 
of deportation.  Nevertheless, international health regulations 
require medically based travel restrictions to adhere to the re-
quirements listed above.12  As a result, the analysis is the same 
since this category covers those who have not yet entered the 
country in the same way as those in the prior category that al-
ready entered legally or illegally.  
Specifically, in terms of HIV travel restrictions, interna-
tional governments restrict basic rights, such as freedom of 
movement, of HIV positive individuals for several reasons, such 
as preserving the public health and the economy.13  In evaluat-
ing this policy, the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, the World Health Organization, and other groups 
conclude that these programs are ineffective in carrying out 
their stated goals; that they actually contribute to greater prob-
                                               
7 Id. 
8 THE GLOBAL DATABASE ON HIV-SPECIFIC TRAVEL AND RESIDENCE 
RESTRICTIONS, http://hivtravel.org/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). 
9 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
10 Id. at 7. 
11 Id. at 6-7. 
12 Lazarus et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
13 See UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 7. 
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lems; and that they are not the least restrictive means.14  De-
spite this, one must note that not all countries look to interna-
tional covenants in making such decisions.  Nevertheless, that 
does not prohibit such countries, like the United States and 
China, from applying this line of reasoning to their own notions 
of equal protection.15  
The remainder of this article will explain why HIV travel 
restrictions are ineffective at achieving their stated goals, and 
how such laws are not the least restrictive means for achieving 
those goals.  In doing so, this paper will be divided into six 
parts. Part two will provide an overview of HIV travel re-
strictions focusing on the scope of the problem, typical justifica-
tions for the laws, and their global impact.  Parts three, four, 
and five will discuss the creation and modification of HIV trav-
el laws in three major counties; namely, the United States, 
China, and Russia.  These sections will analyze the origin of 
the HIV travel restrictions, the impacts and reactions to the 
laws, and how the laws were ultimately eliminated or changed.  
The sixth section will compare the laws in the three countries 
to determine which country’s law, or which combination of 
laws, provides the most effective way of addressing HIV immi-
gration concerns. 
II. Overview of HIV Related Travel Restrictions 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of countries 
with HIV travel restrictions;16 however, as of 2011 it is esti-
                                               
14 See id. at 7-10; Lazarus et al., supra note 2, at 5.  
15 See, e.g., Medical Examination of Aliens—Removal of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection From Definition of Communicable Disease 
of Public Health Significance, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,547, 56,550-54 (Nov. 2, 2009) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34) [hereinafter Medical Examination Remov-
al] (analysis of United States HIV travel law looked at whether or not law 
had a logical basis and used least restrictive method); Dejian Lai et al., 
HIV/AIDS Testing at Ports of Entry in China, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 251, 
252-54 (2011) (analysis of Chinese HIV travel law looked at whether or not 
law had a logical basis). 
16 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 3. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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mated that over sixty countries had some sort of limitation.17  
As addressed earlier, there are four major types of restrictions: 
entry restrictions, short-term restrictions, long-term re-
strictions, and deportation.18  Currently, nearly fifteen coun-
tries have full entry restrictions.19  Likewise, about twenty 
countries restrict short-term stays of ninety days or less, while 
around sixty countries restrict long-term stays.20  Lastly, about 
twenty-five countries deport HIV positive foreigners.21  In all of 
these countries, HIV status must be declared or proven 
through testing upon entry; the method depending on each 
country.22  Of particular concern is whether testing results are 
confidential, whether testing is voluntary, whether there is in-
formed consent, and whether pre and post testing counseling 
are provided.23  These four factors are important in evaluating 
HIV immigration laws, and, as will be demonstrated later, 
their manipulation can turn an overly restrictive law into one 
that avoids discrimination, protects society, and benefits the 
HIV community.  
To better understand the language and implementations of 
HIV laws, it is useful to comprehend why such laws are imple-
mented.  Traditionally, countries gave two major reasons for 
implementation: public health and economics.24  A 2009 study 
by the Denmark World Health Organization confirms that the 
vast majority of countries with such laws listed public health 
as a major reason for implementation.25  The public health jus-
                                               
17 THE GLOBAL DATABASE ON HIV-SPECIFIC TRAVEL AND RESIDENCE 
RESTRICTIONS, supra note 8.  
18 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
19 THE GLOBAL DATABASE ON HIV-SPECIFIC TRAVEL AND RESIDENCE 
RESTRICTIONS, supra note 8. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 2; WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. & UNAIDS, GUIDANCE ON PROVIDER-INITIATED HIV TESTING AND 
COUNSELLING IN HEALTH FACILITIES 30 (2007). 
24 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 1. 
25 Lazarus et al., supra note 2, at 2-5.  
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tification for HIV travel restrictions focuses on the simple 
premise that allowing HIV positive foreigners and returning 
nationals to enter a country will increase the spread of HIV 
within that country.26  While there is no doubt that the mobile 
nature of the modern world shares responsibility for this in-
crease, the nature of HIV does not justify such entry re-
strictions on public health logic.27  The public health justifica-
tion can only be used to deny entry when a disease is spread 
via casual contact, meaning via simple day-to-day encounters 
such as light contact or breathing the same air; however, HIV 
is spread through non-casual contact such as sexual inter-
course or sharing drug needles.28 
As mentioned earlier, international health regulations re-
quire any laws placing travel restrictions on people with a dis-
ease to be based on a solid logical foundation.29  Since HIV is 
not spread via casual contact, the restriction’s logic is flawed.  
Granted, there is the argument that if even one additional per-
son contracts HIV there is a public health concern; however, 
this argument is ineffective since the only legally acceptable 
justification for a restriction is when the disease spreads via 
casual contact because such restrictions cause several prob-
lems.30  
HIV travel restrictions are responsible for causing several 
public health and humanitarian problems.31  Requiring manda-
tory HIV testing to enter or remain in a country encourages 
people to enter illegally and avoid testing, so people do not 
know they are infected and do not take proper precautions.32  
Moreover, by letting people think HIV is solely a foreign prob-
lem, locals neglect to take proper precautions.33  Resultantly, 
                                               
26 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 8. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Lazarus et al., supra note 2, at 5. 
30 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 8. 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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not only do these laws have no basis in public health, but they 
actually contribute to public health and humanitarian con-
cerns. 
The second major justification for HIV travel restrictions 
focuses on protecting the economy.34  Governments claim ad-
mitting HIV positive individuals strains public aid and health 
care.35  While logical, this blanket ban on HIV positive foreign-
ers is not the least restrictive means of protecting an econo-
my.36  Not all people with HIV require government aid as many 
have private insurance, well paying jobs, and/or personal 
wealth.37  The goal of preserving economic growth could be met 
by less restrictive means since case by case analysis would en-
sure the economy can be protected, while allowing HIV indi-
viduals with private resources to enter.38  This reasoning, com-
bined with the lack of public health justification, shows the 
logic behind HIV travel restrictions is ineffective. Before begin-
ning the analysis of the laws of specific countries, it is im-
portant to understand how many people are affected by these 
laws and why such laws must be changed. 
In 2007, over 190 million people lived outside their country 
of birth and nearly 900 million traveled internationally.39  As a 
result, an extremely large number of people are affected by 
travel restriction laws since all people entering countries with 
HIV restrictions must submit to mandatory testing or declare 
HIV status.  Moreover, among those affected, a significant por-
tion includes refugees, asylum seekers, and those seeking reun-
ion with families.40  Although some countries offer ways to by-
pass the HIV laws, these means often fail to reopen the door.41  
This is especially tragic when asylum seekers cannot escape 
                                               
34 Id. at 9. 
35 Id.  
36 See id. at 9-10. 
37 Id. at 9.  
38 See id.  
39  Amon & Todrys, supra note 6, at 2. 
40 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 5. 
41 Sherryl S. Zounes, Positive Movement: Revisiting the HIV Exclusion to 
Legal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 529, 532-33 (2008). 
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the foul practices that drove them away.  Furthermore, there is 
the additional concern of splitting up families.  Following a 
parallel line of reasoning, since many HIV victims come from 
developing countries with little to no medical care, many would 
find it unethical to deny entry when it robs them of treat-
ment.42  
In addition, there are also implications for local and global 
economies.  When a country bans HIV entry, it bans students, 
workers, and specialists who contribute to the economy.43  In 
addition to the obvious human rights issues of denying em-
ployment and education, these countries are being robbed of 
valuable resources and tourist dollars.  Indeed, many countries 
depend on money from tourism, and for some, the annual num-
ber of visitors exceeds the local population.44 
A third effect is the impact of HIV restrictions on global 
health.  Mandatory HIV testing on entry and deportation of 
HIV positive foreigners leads many to enter illegally, avoid 
testing, and avoid getting needed medications to evade detec-
tion.45  Lack of knowledge is especially problematic as people 
continue to spread HIV if they are unaware of having it.46  By 
not getting tested, not only do these individuals put others at 
risk, but they put themselves at risk by not getting the treat-
ment they so desperately need.  
The final global effect focuses on broken confidentiality 
and the resulting stigma.  The confidentially requirements of 
HIV testing are not always observed, and when information 
gets out, the resulting stigma can range from employment dis-
missal to denial of medical care.47  A Chinese study reveals only 
around half of people tested for HIV believed confidentiality 
was maintained, and nearly 11% were certain it was 
                                               
42 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 5. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id.  
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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breached.48  Moreover, almost 25% reported being victims of 
discrimination, such as being refused work or being forced to 
leave it.49  In short, these practices have led to an epidemic of 
discrimination. 
Taken together, these four factors demonstrate that plac-
ing travel restrictions on HIV positive foreigners has a signifi-
cant impact on a wide range of areas from the global economy 
to basic human rights.  Now that the logic and history of HIV 
travel restrictions have been established, it will be applied in 
analyzing the laws of the United States, China, and Russia. 
III. CREATION AND EXPULSION OF HIV TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States first implemented immigration re-
strictions to protect citizens from diseases in 1952 with the 
passage of the “Immigration and Nationality Act,” which pre-
vented entry of foreigners with “communicable diseases of pub-
lic health significance.”50  Since then, the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) and the Department of Human Health and Ser-
vices (DHHS) have been responsible for adding and removing 
diseases, and, in 1987, they added HIV to this list.51  
The regulation was designed to apply to every HIV positive 
foreigner entering the country regardless of entry point, visit 
length, or purpose.52  Moreover, the law mandated the deporta-
tion of foreigners who contracted HIV while in the country.53  
On its face, the law itself is quite simple in that it requires im-
migration personnel to test anyone over the age of fifteen for 
diseases listed as public health threats, regardless of the type 
                                               
48 UNAIDS, THE CHINA STIGMA INDEX REPORT 8 (2009). 
49 Id. at 11.  
50 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,548. 
51 Id. 
52 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, 
H.R.3337, 110th Cong. § 2(1) (2007).  
53 See generally Medical Examination of Aliens, 42 C.F.R. §§ 34.1, 34.3-
34.4 (1991).  
9
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of visa they applied for,54 and no matter an individual’s age, 
immigration personnel is required to test someone if they show 
symptoms.55  If the person is HIV positive, or in the case of 
short term visitors, if the person declared they are HIV posi-
tive, immigration reports the finding and bars entry.56  
Despite these blanket restrictions, there were three ways 
to bypass the law for separated families, refugees seeking asy-
lum, and short term visitors.57  Immigrants with certain family 
ties to legal U.S. residents, such as being a parent or spouse, 
could enter regardless of their HIV status if they met three re-
quirements: first, that there would be minimal public health 
danger by admission; second, that there would be minimal risk 
of spreading HIV by admission; and third, that they would not 
seek government aid without first seeking permission.58  Like-
wise, asylum seekers could enter if they met the first two of the 
above requirements and could prove their home country dis-
criminated against them for reasons such as race or religion.59  
Lastly, HIV positive foreigners seeking short term entry could 
stay for thirty days or less if they met the first and third of the 
above requirements.60  Nevertheless, while these three excep-
tions appeared to be a fair means of bypass; practically, they 
were nearly impossible to invoke.61  In the case of asylum seek-
ers, this difficulty was compounded by having to prove persecu-
tion in one’s native country, especially since HIV discrimina-
tion was not a valid basis for asylum.62  Hence, not only were 
the regulation’s restrictions all inclusive, but the so-called ex-
ceptions were mirages at best.  
                                               
54 Id. § 34.3. 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  §§ 34.2, 34.4.  
57 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(A). 
58 Id. § 2(1)(A)(i)-(iii). 
59 Id. § 2(1)(B); Zounes, supra note 41, at 533-35. 
60 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(C)(i). 
61 See Zounes, supra note 41, at 533-35. 
62 Id. at 534-35. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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Despite the fact that the government enacted the law to 
protect the public health and preserve the economy, the regula-
tion was controversial.63 Critics were concerned with false posi-
tives and felt that, given the existing number of HIV residents, 
excluding a few more individuals would be ineffective.64 Never-
theless, the government asserted that false positives were rare 
and that despite the large numbers of HIV residents, those in-
fected could transfer the disease.65 It is important to note that, 
at the time, this logic was somewhat justified as little was 
known about HIV.66  Furthermore, in response to concerns over 
testing procedures, the government assured that testing would 
be paid for by those tested, that results would be confidential, 
and that counseling would be provided to HIV positive individ-
uals on how to treat HIV and prevent its spread.67  Even 
though the regulation was eventually overturned, 68 these three 
provisions are important to highlight because they show the 
government was trying to narrowly tailor the impact by pre-
venting discrimination and ensuring people got the information 
they needed. 
The first real attempts to change the law came from the 
Public Health Service in 1991; however, political muscle pre-
vented results.69  Soon after, the CDC and DHHS, the govern-
ment organizations that placed HIV on the list of excludable 
public health diseases in the first place, tried to remove it, but 
political opposition prevented them from doing so and Congress 
soon withdrew this power from these departments.70  The CCD 
and the DHHS tried to remove the ban because new infor-
mation on HIV made it evident that the original reason for ex-
                                               
63 See Medical Examination of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,541 (Aug. 
28, 1987) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 34).  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
56,548. 
67 Medical Examination of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. at 32,541-42. 
68 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,548. 
69 Zounes, supra note 41, at 536-37. 
70 Id. at 537. 
11
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cluding foreigners with HIV, the fear that HIV spread via cas-
ual contact, was no longer justified.71  However, Congress stat-
ed that even if there were no legitimate public health reasons, 
there were still economic justifications such as concerns over 
the staggering effects on health care.72  
Aside from few intermittent attempts to change the law, 
there were no other major efforts towards change until after 
2005.73  In 2006 on World AIDS Day, President George W. 
Bush announced steps were in place to remove the HIV travel 
ban.74  A year later, congress proposed the “HIV Nondiscrimi-
nation in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007” to end the re-
strictions.75  While it was never passed, its reasoning is note-
worthy since it was mimicked in the regulation that later 
removed HIV regulations.76  The proposed legislation noted 
that as of 2007, only thirteen countries including Iraq, Libya, 
and Sudan had full entry bans.77  However, it is important to 
note that the U.S. allowed short term visitors to declare their 
HIV status as opposed to requiring testing.78  Moreover, the 
legislation noted that since the law was passed, thousands of 
foreigners had been denied entry on the basis of HIV status 
alone, which likely encouraged illegal immigration and a lack 
of HIV testing, both of which contribute to public health prob-
                                               
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 541.  
73 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong. § 2(12).  
74 Zounes, supra note 42, at 547. 
75 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong.  § 1.  
76 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,550-
53; HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong. § 2. 
77 HIV Nondiscrimination in Travel and Immigration Act of 2007, H.R. 
3337, 110th Cong. § 2(7). 
78 Id. § 2(1) (applicants for temporary admission may not have to submit 
to automatic testing, as do applicants applying for permanent residence, but 
may be required to undergo testing, depending on the particular circum-
stances). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/4
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lems.79  Lastly, the legislation recognized the work of global or-
ganizations, such as the World Health Organization and the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, whose re-
search clearly demonstrated HIV travel restrictions were not 
justified by public health or economic reasoning.80 
By the beginning of 2009, change in the United State’s HIV 
immigration restrictions was inevitable.  With the newly re-
stored power of the CDC and the DHHS to regulate the list of 
excludable public health diseases,81 a joint proposal was creat-
ed to remove HIV from the list so that HIV testing and declara-
tion would no longer be required of foreigners, and that HIV 
status could no longer exclude otherwise qualified candidates.82  
On November 2, 2009, a regulation, which went into effect on 
January 4, 2010, was passed that ended the HIV ban.83  This 
regulation mirrored the CDC and DHHS proposal by removing 
HIV from the list of excludable public health diseases and end-
ing mandatory HIV testing and status declaration.84 
The main justification cited for changing the policy was 
reevaluation of the public health and economic reasoning.85  
The previous public health justification stated HIV was spread 
via casual contact, meaning it was spread by daily activities 
like simple touching or breathing the same air.86  However, 
CDC and DHHS studies showed HIV is not spread by casual 
contact, but rather by non-casual contact like sexual inter-
course or sharing needles.87  
Furthermore, the regulation addressed supplemental con-
cerns that HIV travel restrictions caused substantial public 
health and humanitarian concerns.88  HIV immigration re-
                                               
79 Id. § 2(8)-(9). 
80 Id. § 2(10), (13).  
81 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,548. 
82 Id. at 56,549. 
83 Id. at 56,547. 
84 Id. at 56,547-49. 
85 Id. at 56,550-52. 
86 See id. at 56,550. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 56,550-51. 
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strictions are problematic because mandatory testing and sta-
tus declaration leads to the avoidance of testing and prevents 
people from securing medicine.89  This is problematic as studies 
show proper education and counseling slows down the spread 
of HIV.90   Moreover, such restrictions contribute to humanitar-
ian concerns by causing discrimination against HIV positive 
individuals and by preventing entry of such individuals into 
countries with better medical care.91  Lastly, by targeting for-
eigners, the law misled many to believe HIV is solely a foreign 
problem.92  In fact, the government spent so much time watch-
ing borders it failed to notice the rapid domestic spread of HIV 
by high-risk groups, which could have been lessened if proper 
precautions were taken.93  Consequently, these travel re-
strictions were inconsistent with public health logic and creat-
ed public health and humanitarian problems.  
In addition to discarding the public health logic, the new 
regulation explains why the original economic justification for 
the law was also invalid.  Originally, the government stated 
that admitting HIV foreigners would strain health care; how-
ever, more recent studies show the economic impact was great-
ly overestimated.94  At the time the previous regulation was 
passed, there were no concrete or reliable studies showing that 
a significant portion of immigrants utilized public assistance in 
treating HIV.95  Moreover, the government neglected to consid-
er that immigrants have other means of managing HIV, such 
as insurance and private assets, meaning only a small percent 
use public assistance.96  Furthermore, any public assistance 
that is depleted is likely nullified by the economic contributions 
                                               
89 Id. at 56,550; Zounes, supra note 41, at 539-40. 
90 Zounes, supra note 41, at 539-40. 
91 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,550. 
92 See UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
93 See generally Jeffrey H. Samet, Russia and Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus – Beyond Crime and Punishment, 106 ADDICTION 1883, 1883 (2011). 
94  Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,550, 
56,552. 
95 Id. at 56,552. 
96 Id.  
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of immigrants such as improving the work force, spending 
money, and paying taxes.97  Lastly, the original economic rea-
soning of the regulation was hypocritical in that the U.S. ad-
mitted other immigrants with serious diseases even though 
medical expenses related to such diseases mirror those associ-
ated with HIV medical care.98  
Before getting to the regulation’s estimated impact, it is 
important to note the government considered alternative solu-
tions, but ultimately decided to utilize the method described 
above.99  The first solution considered was to keep the existing 
law in place, but this was quickly dismissed as the law was not 
supported by its logic and contributed to other problems.100  
The second alternative was to continue mandating HIV testing 
upon entry, but to stop using it as a basis for preventing en-
try.101  At first glance, this seems effective since it allows people 
to enter the country while at the same time making infected 
individuals aware of having HIV.102  This alternative would in-
deed be beneficial since awareness leads to people getting the 
help and information they need to prevent HIV’s spread; how-
ever, it was majorly flawed in that it neither resolved the is-
sues of stigmatization nor the issues regarding deprivation of 
autonomy.103  Even if the confidentiality system were improved, 
there is no guarantee that those with access will not break con-
fidentiality.  People deserve to choose when, where, and if they 
should be tested.  Keeping this in mind, along with the fact 
that the stigma associated with HIV has led people to lose their 
jobs, be denied work, and be denied medical care; having volun-
tary and informed testing, accompanied by mandatory counsel-
ing, is a much more effective option.104  
                                               
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 56,553. 
99 Id. at 56,554-55. 
100 Id. at 56,554. 
101 Id. at 56,554-55. 
102 Id. at 56,555. 
103 Id.  
104  Id.; UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 5. 
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In addition to analyzing why the U.S. restrictions should 
be removed, both the new regulation and the CDC analyzed 
what effects and benefits it would have on the global popula-
tion.105  From a broad perspective, there would be several hu-
manitarian benefits of removal, since previously unqualified 
family members could rejoin loved ones, and those seeking asy-
lum and medical care could attain refuge.106  Moreover, by 
providing voluntary testing, counseling, and informed consent, 
the system ensures not only that people with HIV get the aid 
they need, but that the spread of HIV is monitored.  These pro-
cesses of informed and voluntary consent are important be-
cause they make people aware of potential confidentiality is-
sues, prepare them for testing results, help them see the 
importance of testing, and preserve autonomy.107  Likewise, 
counseling for HIV testing is extremely important because with 
testing includes a duty to inform patients about the meaning of 
their results, and to educate them on how to get help and how 
to avoid spreading HIV.108  As such, by removing entry re-
strictions, making testing informed and voluntary, and by 
providing mandatory counseling, this regulation not only ended 
a system based on false logic, but it also alleviated the addi-
tional problems caused by the old system by correcting and ac-
counting for the  issues of discrimination, the avoidance of test-
ing, and the lack of autonomy.  
As mentioned earlier, the modification and implementation 
of the four factors of voluntary testing, informed consent, confi-
dentiality, and counseling is an essential tool in turning a re-
strictive and unethical law into one that avoids discrimination, 
protects society, and benefits the HIV community.109  Keeping 
this in mind along with the analysis articulated above, it is ap-
                                               
105 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,556; 
Guidance for HIV for Panel Physicians and Civil Surgeons, CENTER FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/immig 
rantrefugeehealth/exams/ti/hiv-guidance-panel-civil.html.  
106  Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,557. 
107 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNAIDS, supra note 23.  
108 See generally id.  
109 See id. at 30. 
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parent the United State’s new law demonstrates that an in-
formed design can fix the described problems by manipulating 
these four factors.  
IV. CREATION AND MODIFICATION OF HIV TRAVEL 
RESTRICTIONS IN CHINA 
Ironically, while China’s HIV travel restrictions effectively 
demonstrate how stigma and misplaced blame can lead to pub-
lic health problems, the early history of HIV in China provides 
the perfect example of why countries enacted such restrictions 
in the first place.110  China’s HIV epidemic is divided into four 
phases: the first, from 1985-1988; the second, from 1989-1993; 
the third, from 1994-2000; and the fourth, from 2001 to the 
present.111  
The first confirmed HIV case in China occurred in 1985 
through an American tourist.112  In fact, it is well-established 
that the first phase of the disease resulted almost exclusively 
from the entry of HIV positive foreigners, the return of HIV 
positive Chinese citizens, and the importation of infected medi-
cal products.113  Consequently, during the first two phases of 
HIV in China, the disease was concentrated almost exclusively 
in border areas.114  It was not until the third phase that HIV 
spread inward, at which point it did so like a wild fire until it 
engulfed the entire country.115  While the reasons for this rapid 
spread will be explained in detail later, for now, it is sufficient 
to note that it resulted partly from enacting discriminatory 
laws and specifically from misplaced blame and discrimination 
                                               
110 See generally Sheng Lei & Cao Wu-kui, HIV/AIDS Epidemiology and 
Prevention in China, 121 CHIN. MED. J. 1230, 1230-33 (2008). 
111 Id. at 1230.  
112 Bin Xue, HIV/AIDS Policy and Policy Evolution in China, 16 INT’L J. 
STD & AIDS 459, 459 (2005). 
113 Id.; Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230. 
114 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230; Zunyou Wu et al., The 
HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China: History, Current Strategies and Future Chal-
lenges, 16 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 7, 8 (June Supp. 2004).    
115 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230, 1232.  
17
DEFAZIOMCR (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2013  5:38 PM 
106 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXV:1 
 
towards the high-risk groups spreading HIV.116  A study of 
China’s HIV restrictions will be valuable in analyzing both why 
such laws are passed and what ill effects such laws bring forth.  
China’s HIV travel restrictions consist of three separate 
laws passed over four years.117  It is noteworthy that all three 
laws resulted from the idea that China’s first two HIV stages 
resulted almost exclusively from the entry of HIV positive for-
eigners, the return of HIV positive Chinese citizens, and the 
importation of infected medical supplies.118   
The first law, the “Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of 
the People’s Republic of China,” sought to protect the public 
health by preventing HIV and other infectious diseases from 
entering and spreading throughout the country.119  The law 
sought to achieve this objective in two ways.  First, it required 
mandatory testing, or proof of negative status, for all foreigners 
entering the country, and if an infectious disease was detected, 
the person needed to be isolated so proper steps could be tak-
en.120  Second, it required sanitization of all property that came 
into contact with an infectious disease like HIV.121  If these 
provisions were not obeyed, violators could be subject to fines 
and criminal penalties.122  As such, the law focused on HIV pos-
                                               
116 See id. at 1231–32. 
117 Rules for the Implementation of Frontier Health and Quarantine 
Law, (promulgated by Decree No. 2 of the Ministry of Pub. Health, Feb. 10, 
1989, effective Mar. 6, 1989) art. 1 (Lawinfochina) (China), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/travel/2008-01/03/content_1225541.htm; Certain 
Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS (promulgated by Ministry 
of Pub. Health et al., Dec. 26, 1987, effective Jan. 14, 1988) art. 1 
(Lawinfochina) (China);  Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by Order No. 46 of the President of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1986, effective May 1, 1987) art. 1 
(Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-
08/29/content_27332. htm.  
118 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230, 1232; Wu et al., supra note 
114, at 8.  
119 See Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, art. 1.  
120 Id. art. 5, 12, 16.  
121 Id. art. 13.  
122 Id. art. 20, 22.  
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itive foreigners and regulation of materials exposed to infec-
tion, although on a seemingly introductory level.  
The second law, the “Certain Regulations on the Monitor-
ing and Control of AIDS” act, addressed these issues with a 
more specific focus.123  As with the first law, it sought to protect 
public health; however, it did so through four methods focused 
exclusively on people and items contaminated with HIV.124  
First, it required all foreigners entering China to undergo 
mandatory HIV testing or to prove negative HIV status to se-
cure entry.125  Second, it required Chinese citizens who had 
been abroad for over a year to undergo the same testing, and if 
deemed HIV positive, to be denied entry.126  Third, it required 
foreigners who contracted HIV while in China to be deported, 
and fourth, it required the inspection of imported medical 
products.127  Despite these regulations, the law did provide for 
strict confidentiality and nondiscrimination requirements.128  
The third law, the “Rules for the Implementation of Fron-
tier Health and Quarantine Law”, modified the first law by fo-
cusing more specifically on HIV.129  While the first law only 
stated that people with infectious diseases needed to be isolat-
ed so appropriate steps could be taken,130 this modification di-
rectly stated that those with HIV, whether they be entering 
foreigners or returning citizens, needed to be excluded from en-
try.131  
                                               
123 See Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS, art. 
1.  
124 Id. art. 1-2, 4-5, 7-8, 11. 
125 Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS, art. 1-2, 
4, 5. 
126 Id. art. 8.  
127 Id. art. 7, 11.  
128 Id. art. 21. 
129 See generally Rules for the Implementation of Frontier Health and 
Quarantine Law, art. 1. 
130 Frontier Health and Quarantine Law of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na, art. 5, 12. 
131 Rules for the Implementation of Frontier Health and Quarantine 
Law, art. 99. 
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Despite the protections laid out in these laws, it soon be-
came apparent that such laws were inconsistent with public 
health promotion and economic logic, and contributed to addi-
tional problems.132  Specifically, these laws contributed to the 
rapid inward expansion of HIV in China’s third HIV phase, 
confidentiality issues, and discrimination.133  
HIV travel restrictions like China’s are ineffective at meet-
ing their stated goals of promoting public health and the econ-
omy.134  In the case of public health, the only legitimate argu-
ment for the Chinese initiatives exists if HIV were spread by 
casual contact, but since it is not spread in this way, the initia-
tives are illogical.135  However, considering that the birth of 
HIV in China resulted almost exclusively from immigration, 136 
this logic likely took quite some time to sink in.  Likewise, the 
economic argument that there will be a strain on health care 
holds little weight because many people have private assets 
and because HIV testing on such a massive scale is expen-
sive.137  
Nevertheless, the real problem with China’s HIV laws is 
not their logical inconsistencies, but rather the resulting public 
health problems.  The first problem, mentioned earlier, is that 
these laws contributed to the rapid HIV spread in China’s third 
HIV stage.138  By passing HIV travel laws, the government mis-
led people into thinking HIV was a foreign problem.  As a re-
sult, neither the government nor the people took proper pre-
cautions.139  Unfortunately, the government was so focused on 
protecting borders that it failed to notice domestic groups 
                                               
132 See Lai et al., supra note 15, at 253. 
133 See id. at 252-54; Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-32. 
134 See UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 5, 8. 
135 Id. at 8. 
136 See Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-32. 
137 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 9-10; Lai 
et al., supra note 15, at 253. 
138 See Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-32.  
139 See id.; UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 8-
9. 
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spreading HIV at alarming rates.140  Specifically, the govern-
ment was delayed in detecting high-risk groups, including in-
jection drug users, illegal blood donors, and prostitutes, who 
were transforming the HIV situation from mere border preva-
lence to total saturation.141  It is estimated that these risk 
groups are responsible for over eighty percent of HIV cases in 
China, while the percentage spread via foreigners is compara-
bly minimal.142  These statistics are supported by the fact that 
the rapid spread of HIV did not cease until the government 
took steps to target high-risk groups.143  
In addition, China’s HIV laws contributed to problems 
with discrimination and confidentiality.144  In a 2009 study, the 
majority of HIV positive individuals reported social stigma 
ranging from ostracism by friends and family to not being al-
lowed near children.145  Likewise, nearly half of the reported 
discriminations ranged from simple gossip to employment de-
nial.146  In fact, nearly 12% were even denied medical care.147  
Although 12% is admittedly a small number, one must consider 
the deadly threat HIV presents.  Even a denial to 1% of this 
group is an outrageous human rights violation.  As for confi-
dentiality, despite privacy laws only 40% of participants were 
certain confidentiality was maintained and nearly a tenth were 
positive it had been breached.148  Considering the discrimina-
tions listed above, along with other reports of abuse, it is evi-
dent that the confidentially and antidiscrimination policies in 
China’s HIV laws are ineffective.149  
                                               
140 See Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-32. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. at 1231. 
143 See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
CHINA 2010 UNGASS COUNTRY PROGRESS REPORT: 2008-2009, at 32-34 (2010).  
144 UNAIDS, supra note 48, at 5-13. 
145 Id. at 5. 
146 Id. at 11.  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 8.  
149 Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS, art. 21; 
Lai et al., supra note 15, at 253. 
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In order to combat the public health effects of China’s HIV 
travel restriction laws, the government responded with both in-
ternal reform and modification of the restrictions.150  It is use-
ful to analyze the domestic approach, despite the international 
focus of this article, because the analysis will shed light on two 
additional factors that can be manipulated to lessen the after 
effects of HIV travel restrictions as well as the overall spread of 
HIV.   
The domestic approach placed special emphasis on educa-
tion and high-risk groups.151  The government undertook large 
efforts to publicize HIV and its spread via public ad campaigns, 
sex education classes, radio broadcasts, websites, and TV sta-
tions.152  Considering that at the turn of the century the con-
cept of sex was taboo in China and that sexual education in 
schools was banned,153 such a dramatic policy change is ex-
tremely impressive.  As a result of these open minded ap-
proaches, the rate of increase in HIV, which had been steadily 
rising since the early 1990s, finally began to decrease.154  
While the advancements mentioned above are impressive, 
the most effective results are seen by the targeted efforts to-
wards high-risk groups; namely, injection drug users, the sex 
trade, and blood donorship.155  In the case of injection drug us-
ers, the government opened drug clinics to help them with ad-
diction and as of 2009 nearly a quarter of a million people had 
utilized such programs.156  In addition, the government used 
needle awareness programs to inform the public on the dangers 
of HIV transfer via drug needles, and, as a result, sterile needle 
use jumped from nearly 40% to just over 70% from 2007 to 
                                               
150  MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra 
note 143, at 6-11, 31-41. 
151 Id. at 7, 33.  
152 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1234. 
153 See id.  
154 See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, su-
pra note 143, at 5.  
155 Id. at 33; Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1233.  
156 MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra 
note 143, at 33-34. 
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2009.157  Likewise, in the case of sex workers, the government 
heavily publicized condom use, and resultantly, condom use 
rose from 50% to nearly 80% over the same period.158  As for 
poor blood donor practices, the government passed laws closing 
all blood centers until they satisfied new standards.159  While 
some say such action was drastic, the methods appear to be 
justified considering that nearly a quarter of people with HIV 
contracted it from contaminated blood.160  The final policy, 
which benefited all of China, involved funding more HIV test-
ing centers, as well as spreading awareness that HIV testing 
was important.161  As a result of such polices, HIV testing in-
creased dramatically and in 2009 over one and a half million 
people were tested.162  
In addition to attacking the public health and human 
rights effects of HIV travel restrictions through domestic poli-
cies, China directly attacked the regulations themselves.  On 
April 24, 2010, the government passed a law that continued the 
mandatory HIV testing of foreigners, but enabled foreigners 
with HIV to enter China for a period of less than a year.163  
Likewise, foreigners already in China needed to undergo HIV 
testing to obtain residency.164  While this new law did away 
with the entry ban of HIV positive foreigners, it maintained 
mandatory HIV testing and prevented HV positive foreigners 
                                               
157 Id. at 34. 
158 Id. at 33.  
159 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1233. 
160 Id. at 1231. 
161 MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra 
note 143, at 37-38. 
162 Id. 36-37.  
163 See generally Decision of the State Council on Amending the Detailed 
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China 
Governing the Administration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners (promulgated 
by Order No. 575 of the People’s Republic of China State Council, Apr. 24, 
2010) (China), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2010-04/27/content _15945 
07.htm; Lai et al., supra note 15, at 255, 257. 
164 Decision of the State Council on Amending the Detailed Rules for the 
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China Governing the 
Administration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners, art. 17(C).  
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from staying for over a year.165  
Before moving on to the final Chinese initiative, it will 
help to evaluate the April 24, 2010 law.  First, it is important 
to note that this new law did not address HIV entry re-
strictions for returning Chinese citizens who spent over a year 
abroad.  Second, it is noteworthy that while the full ban on HIV 
positive foreigner entry was lifted, mandatory testing remained 
along with a ban on stays for over one year.166  While these 
modifications were a step in the right direction, they did noth-
ing to solve the problems of autonomy and little to counter the 
overall public health effects.167  Granted, the domestic polices 
mentioned earlier counter some of these public health issues, 
but there is still the problem of autonomy and remaining issues 
with stigmatization.168  
The second HIV regulation, passed in November of 2010, 
modified the earlier 2010 law.169  Specifically, articles eight 
through eleven of the original law were modified to remove the 
entry ban for returning Chinese citizens abroad for over one 
year.170  Moreover, the modification replaced mandatory testing 
for this group with a need to declare HIV status.171  However, 
the law still maintained mandatory testing and an entry ban 
for all foreigners seeking to enter for over a year or seeking an 
adjustment to resident status.172  
In evaluating this final law, it is important to note that as 
long as there is mandatory testing and entry restrictions, the 
economic and public health reasoning behind the law will be 
invalid since HIV is not spread through casual contact and 
                                               
165 Lai et al., supra note 15, at 255, 257.  
166 Decision of the State Council on Amending the Detailed Rules for the 
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China Governing the 
Administration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners, art. 17(C); Lai et al., supra 
note 15, at 255, 257. 
167 See Lai et al., supra note 15, at 258. 
168 See id.  
169 Id. at 255. 
170 Id.  
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since economic concerns are nullified by private insurance and 
economic contributions.173  Moreover, even with the domestic 
measures taken by China to lessen these issues and public 
health effects created by the law, there are still issues with the 
lack of autonomy and the public health hazards generated by 
the law, while mandatory testing and entry restrictions remain 
in place.174  In addition, the law does not manipulate the other 
factors previously mentioned, including informed consent and 
counseling, which, as shown earlier, can be useful at lessening 
these effects.175  Hence, while the modification of the original 
law is a step in the right direction, it neglects to solve all of the 
described problems.  
V. CREATION AND MODIFICATION OF HIV TRAVEL 
RESTRICTIONS IN RUSSIA 
While the HIV situation in the United States and China 
began in the mid 1980s,176 Russia had the advantage of being 
able to learn from the mistakes of others, as its HIV problems 
did not emerge until the late 1990s.177  Russia could have 
learned from how both of these countries kept too much focus 
on the border and neglected to focus on high-risk domestic 
groups responsible for the rapid spread of HIV.178  However, 
Russia failed to do so, and of the one million HIV victims in 
Russia as of 2010, nearly 85% contracted it via drug use.179  Re-
sultantly, not only will an analysis of Russia provide further 
proof of the faults of HIV travel restrictions, but it will further 
demonstrate the havoc willful blindness and discrimination 
reaps on society. 
                                               
173 See UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 2. 
174 See Lai et al., supra note 15, at 258. 
175 See id. 
176 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,548; 
Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230. 
177 Samet, supra note 93, at 1883.  
178 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-33; see Samet, supra note 93, 
at 1883. 
179 See Samet, supra note 93, at 1883. 
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While Russia’s HIV problems did not begin to emerge until 
the 1990s,180 it quickly responded with numerous laws to com-
bat HIV’s spread by foreigners and those infected.181  Of these, 
three laws must be addressed to understand how the European 
Court of Human Rights utilized international law to challenge 
Russia’s HIV travel restrictions.182  
The first law specifically addressed HIV’s spread by for-
eigners.183  It was enacted due to the massive global spread of 
HIV, which Russia saw as a threat to the public health, econo-
my, and society.184  In doing so, the law required foreigners 
seeking to enter for over three months to prove HIV negative 
status to secure entry.185  Moreover, foreigners already in the 
country could be deported if they contracted HIV, even if they 
had become citizens.186  In addition, the statute promised to 
keep the public informed of the HIV epidemic, provide testing 
with anonymous pre-test and post-test counseling, and find 
ways to prevent HIV’s spread.187  Yet, while Russia took these 
steps to prevent stigma and misdirection, it failed to prevent 
misguidance and discrimination from contributing to the rapid 
spread of HIV via injection drug users.188  
Russia’s second major HIV law focused on criminalizing 
HIV’s spread.189  Specifically, it criminalized spreading HIV, 
whether by foreigners or domestic citizens, regardless of 
                                               
180 Id. 
181 See Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 16-25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2011). 
182 Id.  
183 [Federal Law on the Prevention of the Incidence of the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus (HIV) Disease in the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE 
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] Mar. 30, 1995, No. 38-FZ, 
pmbl. [hereinafter Federal Law No. 38-FZ]. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. art. 10(1).  
186 Id. art 11(2).  
187 Id. art 4(1). 
188 Samet, supra note 93, at 1883. 
189 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RK] [Criminal Code] 
art. 122 (Rus.), available at http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/ [hereinaf-
ter Russia Criminal Code].  
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awareness of having HIV.190  Those who spread it without 
knowing they had it faced three years in prison, and those who 
were aware of having it could face five years in prison.191  
Russia’s third law focused on foreigners trying to enter the 
country or gain residence.192  While its scope is broad, there are 
a few relevant sections.  The first is that all temporary visitors, 
absent proof of HIV negative status, must leave within ninety 
days.193  The second is that foreigners seeking permanent resi-
dence can be denied it if they cannot prove HIV negative sta-
tus.194  The third states that foreigners can obtain a three-year 
temporary residence permit if married to a Russian citizen liv-
ing in Russia; however, such permits are denied if one is HIV 
positive.195  
Now that the background has been established, it is time 
to discuss Russia’s major case on HIV travel restrictions and 
the decision that paved the foundation for this major case.  The 
preliminary case occurred in Russia’s Constitutional Court in 
2006, and involved a HIV positive foreigner that wanted tem-
porary residence to live with his Russian wife.196  The foreigner 
argued that article 7(13) of the “Foreign Nationals Act” and ar-
ticle 11(2) of the “HIV Prevention Act” gave him the right to 
bypass the HIV requirement since his wife was a Russian citi-
zen/resident and since not doing so would deny equal protec-
tion.197  Unfortunately, the court decided the public health logic 
outweighed these equal protection violations and denied the 
permit.198  
                                               
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 [Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian 
Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] July 
25, 2002, No. 115-FZ, art. 5-6 [hereinafter Federal Law No. 115-F].     
193 Id. art 5(1), 10.  
194 Id. art. 9(13). 
195 Id. art. 6(1-3), 7(13). 
196 See Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 24-26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2011). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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As discussed earlier, under international law countries 
have the authority to regulate who can stay within their bor-
ders, and that the applicable regulations can overcome equal 
protection issues if there is a solid basis in logic and utilization 
of the least restrictive method.199  Russia, being subject to such 
an international agreement, must meet these standards to ex-
clude temporary residence permits on the basis of HIV.200  In 
the 2006 case previously mentioned, the Russian Constitution-
al Court declared these requirements were met in such a situa-
tion; however, the Kiyutin decision says otherwise.201  The facts 
of Kiyutin are nearly identical to the facts in the Constitutional 
Court case.  Specifically, Victor Kiyutin legally entered Russia, 
married a Russian citizen, and had a child.202 However, when 
he applied for temporary residence via articles 6 and 7 of the 
Foreign National Act, the government denied his three year 
permit on the basis on his having HIV.203  
In deciding Kiyutin, the court began by discussing the ap-
plicability of international law to this problem via its analysis 
of articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR).204  Article 8 states “everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life” and that the government 
cannot interfere with this right without a public health, eco-
nomic, and/or societal interests.205  Article 14 states that rights 
guaranteed by this covenant “shall be secured without discrim-
ination on any grounds such as sex, race . . . or other status.”206  
In looking at the language of these articles, a few things must 
be clarified.  
First, the court notes article 8 standing alone does not re-
                                               
199 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
200 See Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 39.   
201 Id. ¶¶ 66-74.  
202 Id. ¶¶ 1-8.  
203 Id. ¶¶ 9-11.  
204 Id. ¶¶ 53-59.  
205 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Con-
vention].  
206 Id. art. 14. 
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quire a country to respect the desires of married couples to live 
in a country of origin; however, such limitations must be con-
sistent with human rights.207  Likewise, article 14 by itself pro-
vides no real equal protection unless coupled with another law, 
but these two articles can work together if the problem falls 
within their scope.208  
While the separation of families clearly falls under article 
8, article 14 is only effective when the discrimination falls into 
acceptable categories.209  Fortunately, past precedent, along 
with groups like the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights, considers the term “other status” in article 14 to in-
clude health status.210  As such, together these two articles can 
address the denial of a temporary residence visas on the basis 
of HIV. 
After establishing the applicability of international law, 
the court inquired into whether Kiyutin was comparable to 
others seeking such a temporary visa as there couldn’t be al-
ternative reasons for denying entry.211  Specifically, the law 
says one is eligible for temporary residence when said person is 
married to a Russian citizen living in Russia.212  In this regard, 
Kiyutin measured up perfectly with others seeking such a visa 
as he was married to such a person.213  
After establishing that Kiyutin was analogous to other ap-
plicants, the court began its analysis of whether the different 
treatment in this case on the basis of HIV status was founded 
in both “a legitimate aim and . . . a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realized.”214  In civil rights cases, this level of pro-
portionality has little leeway as, due to the relative importance, 
                                               
207 Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 53.   
208 Id. ¶¶ 54. 
209 Id. ¶¶ 54, 56. 
210 Id. ¶¶ 56-58. 
211 Id. ¶ 59-62. 
212 Federal Law No. 115-F, supra note 192, art. 6(3). 
213 Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 60.   
214 Id. ¶¶ 61-62.  
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the law must utilize the least restrictive means.215  This is es-
pecially true when the group has been a target of discrimina-
tion in the past.216  Since the disease began in the 1980s, HIV 
victims have been subject to a wide range of discriminations 
from physical violence to health care denial.217  Even after new 
developments came to light on how HIV was spread, this perse-
cution continued, and has been verified by United Nations re-
ports.218 The court held HIV victims had a history of discrimi-
nation, so the law would need to utilize legitimate logic and the 
least restrictive means in achieving its goals to exclude Victor 
Kiyutin.219  
In beginning its analysis, the court looked at the preamble 
of the “HIV Prevention Act,” which provided that HIV re-
strictions were based on the need to preserve the public health 
and the economy.220  In analyzing the preamble, the court de-
termined its logic was cursory, so it decided to take a closer 
look.221  In terms of public health, the court determined the log-
ic was flawed, and it did not utilize the least restrictive 
means.222  Specifically, the court held the public health logic 
was flawed as travel restrictions based on diseases can only be 
justified if the disease is spread by casual contact.223  Since HIV 
is spread by non-casual contact, the logic is unsound.224  In re-
gards to utilizing the least restrictive means, the court decided 
it would be more effective and less restrictive to focus on indi-
vidual high-risk activities such as promoting condom use or 
clean needles.225  Likewise, since HIV transfer was subject to 
criminal penalties, Russia already had means of preventing 
                                               
215 See id. ¶¶ 62-63. 
216 Id. ¶ 63. 
217 Id. ¶ 64. 
218 Id. ¶¶ 64-65. 
219 See id. 
220 Id. ¶ 66. 
221 Id.    
222 Id. ¶ 68.  
223 Id.  
224 Id. 
225 See id.  
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HIV’s spread and the government could not sufficiently justify 
why criminal penalties were not enough of a deterrent.226  
Hence, the court decided the “HIV Prevention Act” relied on in-
sufficient logic and failed to utilize the least restrictive means. 
In addition, the court held that such laws were hypocritical 
and led to public health problems.227  The court noted there was 
no logic behind allowing entry for short term visitors and re-
turning nationals, but not allowing long term entry to foreign-
ers.228  Statistically, not only do these two groups greatly out-
weigh the third, but the risk of transfer is exactly the same, so 
it is illogical to allow entry to the first two groups, but not the 
third one.229  Likewise, the law does not limit the return rate of 
short-term visitors, and the government had said Kiyutin could 
leave every ninety days and return on a continual cycle.230  
Moreover, the economic reasoning behind the law is incon-
sistent since foreigners cannot use free medical care in Rus-
sia.231  Lastly, in regards to the causation of public health is-
sues, the court noted such laws not only lead foreigners to 
enter illegally and avoid testing, but also lead residents to be-
lieve HIV is solely a foreign problem, both of which cause peo-
ple to fail to take proper precautions.232  
In its final level of analysis, the court determined the utili-
zation of blanket restrictions in the “HIV Prevention Act” and 
the “Foreign Nationals Act” resulted in a failure to utilize the 
least restrictive methods.233 Specifically, the court held that by 
utilizing blanket restrictions rather than individual assess-
ments, such as looking at family concerns, the laws were overly 
restrictive.234 
                                               
226 Id.  
227 Id. ¶¶ 69-72. 
228 Id. ¶ 69. 
229 Id.  
230 Id.  
231 Id. ¶ 70. 
232 Id. ¶ 71. 
233 Id. ¶¶ 72-74.  
234 Id. 
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As a result of the above analysis, the court concluded the 
denial of a temporary residence permit, due solely to HIV sta-
tus, violates articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR since the laws in 
question had no logical basis, were hypocritical, caused public 
health problems, and failed to utilize the least restrictive 
means.235  As a result, the court granted Kiyutin’s entry per-
mit, awarded him 20,000 euros in non-pecuniary damages, 
15,000 euros for emotional distress resulting from discrimina-
tion, and reasonable legal costs.236 
Before comparing all three countries, it is helpful to de-
termine exactly what Kiyutin stands for.  While Kiyutin goes into 
some detail on how the relevant sections of the “Foreign Na-
tionals Act” and “HIV Prevention Act” do not satisfy articles 8 
and 14 of the ECHR, the court never specifically discards these 
laws.237  Likewise, while the court states equal protection is 
violated by excluding a temporary residence permit to an oth-
erwise qualified candidate due to HIV, this logic is restricted to 
the concept of marriage via article 8 of the ECHR.238  As such, 
in the case of regular residence permits in the “Foreign Na-
tionals Act” and ninety day entry limits in the “HIV Prevention 
Act,” while the same type of equal protection argument would 
seem on point, neither matter deals with family rights so the 
Kiyutin decision does not apply.239  Nevertheless, Kiyutin creates 
an extremely important baseline for dealing with future cases 
involving Russia’s HIV travel restrictions.  In reaching its deci-
sion, the court decided people with HIV are a group that has 
been historically discriminated against, which means that any 
regulations that discriminate against those with HIV will be 
held to the strictest level of scrutiny.240  This, combined with 
the fact that the court’s opinion favors individual assessment 
                                               
235 Id. ¶¶ 65-74. 
236 Id. ¶¶ 78-83. 
237 Id. ¶¶ 53-83. 
238 Id.  
239 Federal Law No. 38-FZ, supra note 183, art. 10(1), 11(2); Federal Law 
No. 115-F, supra note 192, art. 9(13). 
240 Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 61-65. 
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over blanket HIV restrictions and does not favor the public 
health and economic reasons for HIV travel restrictions, indi-
cates Russia’s other HIV travel restrictions will not last much 
longer.241 
VI. MAKING COMPARISONS: SEEKING A METHOD THAT 
BENEFITS SOCIETY AND HIV VICTIMS 
In looking at the laws of the United States, China, and 
Russia, as well as international perspectives on the matter, not 
only is it apparent that there is no legitimate public health or 
economic justifications for HIV immigration restrictions requir-
ing mandatory testing to secure entry, but also that these laws 
contribute to public health problems.  However, at the same 
time, not doing anything about the problem is just as, if not 
more, dangerous since lack of awareness prevents the govern-
ment and its citizens from taking the necessary steps to protect 
others from the spread of HIV.  This point has been demon-
strated only too well by the rapid spread of HIV in all three 
countries while their governments were ignoring the problem 
and/or focusing on the wrong outlets.242  In order to solve this 
problem in a way that avoids discrimination, protects society, 
and benefits the HIV community, one must look closely at and 
compare all three approaches to take advantage of the collec-
tive knowledge learned from past mistakes.  
Fortunately, in making this comparison, guidelines are 
provided by groups such as UNAIDs and the World Health Or-
ganization.   These entities recommend the manipulation of 
four factors to ensure that both the interests of society and the 
HIV community are protected.243 Specifically, they recommend 
all HIV testing should be done voluntarily, utilize informed 
consent, maintain confidentiality, and include pre and post test 
                                               
241 Id. ¶¶ 68-72. 
242 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-32; Samet, supra note 93, at 
1883-84. 
243 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. & UNAIDS, supra note 23, at 30; UNAIDS & 
IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 2. 
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counseling.244  Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the HIV prob-
lem in China, two additional factors must be considered as 
well; the utilization of education and targeted aid towards 
high-risk groups.245  Hence, it will take an analysis of all six 
factors to determine what system is best. 
Utilizing these factors, it would seem Russia’s current HIV 
policies would come in third place.  However, an important dis-
claimer must be attached to this placement because while the 
United States and China have had over twenty-five years to 
deal with HIV, Russia has only been dealing with it for around 
fifteen years and already has made truly remarkable pro-
gress.246  
The source of Russia’s new approach to HIV, the Kiyutin 
case, ensures the government cannot deny foreigners a tempo-
rary residence permit in order to live with a Russian spouse 
merely on the basis on having HIV.247  This new approach rep-
resents a substantial change from its original policy of not 
granting any form of residence permit to foreigners with HIV.  
However, while the logic of the court’s holding could be extend-
ed to other forms of HIV restrictions such as full residence 
permits, the court neglected to comment on the scope of its rul-
ing and further application would require the use of different 
articles of the ECHR.248  Resultantly, for all foreigners seeking 
residency permits in Russia, other than those falling under the 
Kiyutin exception, mandatory verification of HIV status is still 
required.249  That being said, Kiyutin creates an extremely im-
portant baseline for dealing with future cases involving HIV 
travel restrictions, as the court decided people with HIV have 
                                               
244 Id. 
245 See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, su-
pra note 143, at 5; Samet, supra note 93, at 1883-84. 
246 See Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 
56,548; Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1230-33; Samet, supra note 93, at 
1883. 
247See Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, ¶ 74 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
248 Id. at ¶¶ 74-81.  
249 Federal Law No. 115-F, supra note 192, art. 10(1); Federal Law No. 
115-FZ, supra note 134, art. 7(13). 
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been historically discriminated against, which means any regu-
lations discriminating against them will be held to the strictest 
level of scrutiny.250  Considering the fact that the court’s opin-
ion favors individual assessment over blanket restrictions and 
disfavors the typical public health and economic reasons for 
HIV travel restrictions, this seems to indicate that Russia’s 
other HIV travel restrictions will not last much longer.251  In 
addition, it is important to point out that HIV testing in Russia 
has confidentially policies in place along with pre and post test 
counseling.252  However, Russia has not adopted any effective 
policies of education or targeted efforts towards high-risk 
groups.253  Resultantly, in looking at the six factors, while Rus-
sia has ensured its testing polices utilize informed consent, con-
fidentiality, and pre and post test counseling, it has failed to 
change its mandatory HIV verification requirements for a large 
percentage of incoming immigrants and has failed to utilize 
education and targeted programs to combat the HIV problem.  
Unfortunately, this lack of progress is evidenced by the increas-
ingly rapid spread of HIV within Russia and its cities.254 
In comparison, China would seem to come in second place.  
Although it also has yet to remove all entry restrictions and 
mandatory testing, it has removed restrictions for a larger por-
tion of entering immigrants and satisfies more of the six rec-
ommended factors.255  Specifically, China’s two latest HIV laws 
removed all short term entry restrictions for foreigners and re-
turning nationals, but kept in place mandatory testing and 
mandatory proof of HIV status for foreigners seeking to stay for 
over a year and returning nationals abroad for over a year.256  
                                               
250 Kiyutin, App. No. 2700/10, ¶¶ 61-65.  
251 See id. ¶¶ 68-72. 
252 Federal Law No. 115-F, supra note 192, art. 10(1); Federal Law No. 
38-FZ, supra note 183, art. 4(1). 
253 See Samet, supra note 93, at 1883. 
254 Id. 
255 See Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS, art.  
21; Lai et al., supra note 15, at 258-59; MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 143, at 5-6.  
256 Decision of the State Council on Amending the Detailed Rules for the 
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While China’s testing policies are designed to ensure confiden-
tiality, they do not incorporate policies of informed consent or 
pre and post test counseling,257 which is dangerous since people 
do not learn how to prevent spreading HIV and are not told of 
the risks and stigmas that they will be facing.  China, however, 
largely makes up for these omissions though utilizing remark-
ably effective educational programs and programs targeting 
high-risk groups, which have helped to finally slow the rapid 
spread of HIV in China.258  Indeed, such programs transformed 
condom use among sex workers and safe needle use among in-
jection drug users from nonexistent to something utilized by 
over seventy percent of each of these high-risk populations.259  
Consequently, China’s HIV immigration laws are superior to 
Russia’s because while they do not utilize informed consent and 
pre/post test counseling, they ensure confidentially, apply edu-
cation and targeted programs towards high-risk groups, and 
most importantly, have changed mandatory testing require-
ments from ones that effected all incoming immigrants to ones 
that only effect those seeking permanent residence.260  
Finally, utilizing an analysis of all six factors defined 
above, the United States would come in first place in its han-
dling of its HIV Immigration policy.  Unlike China and Russia, 
the United States has successfully removed all of its HIV entry 
restrictions, and HIV testing is now completely voluntary for 
all entering foreigners in order to preserve their fundamental 
right to autonomy.261  In addition, the CDC has ensured that 
not only are measures in place to protect confidentiality, but 
                                                                                                         
Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China Governing the 
Administration of Entry and Exit of Foreigners, art. 2; Lai et al., supra note 
15, at 258-59. 
257 See generally Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of 
AIDS, art. 21.  
258 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1232-34; MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 143, at 5. 
259 MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra 
note 143, at 33-34. 
260 Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1232-34.  
261 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56547, 
56554. 
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also that all testing will be accompanied by informed consent 
and pre and post test counseling, which ensures that people are 
aware of how HIV spreads and what stigmas they may be fac-
ing.262  
Lastly, through Ryan White Laws, the United States uti-
lizes education programs and policies to focus on high-risk 
groups and geographical areas in order to help lessen the 
spread of HIV within its borders and prevent stigma by educat-
ing the population.263  In short, the United States’ current HIV 
Immigration Laws satisfy all six factors outlined above in that 
the testing is voluntary, protects confidentiality, utilizes in-
formed consent, makes use of pre and post test counseling, and 
uses both education and targeted polices to prevent the spread 
of HIV within its borders. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Through the comparison of the HIV travel restrictions in 
the United States, China, and Russia, it is readily apparent 
that banning HIV positive individuals from entering a coun-
try’s borders protects neither the public health nor the global 
economy.  Ironically, while preventing the entry of HIV positive 
foreigners may seem logical at first, in practice it contributes to 
public health problems as the resulting stigma creates fear of 
testing, which amplifies problems exponentially as people can-
not prevent spreading a disease they are unaware of having.264  
Even if one admits that the first few strands of HIV initially 
enter through a country’s borders, the true danger begins when 
domestic groups rapidly spread the disease inward.265  This re-
                                               
262 Guidance for HIV for Panel Physicians and Civil Surgeons, supra note 
105. 
263 See generally Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency 
Acts of 1990, S. 2240, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted); Ryan White HIV/AIDS 
Treatment Modernization act of 2006, H.R. 6143, 109th Cong. (2006) (enact-
ed); Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Extension Act of 2009, S. 1793, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (enacted). 
264 UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
265 See Lei & Wu-kui, supra note 110, at 1231-32. 
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ality, coupled with the severe human rights abuses that result 
from the stigma of HIV, such as denial of medical care, denial 
of work, and ostracism from the community,266 clearly demon-
strates mandatory HIV testing to secure entry at borders is in-
effective, inefficient, and inhumane.  
As a solution to this problem, this comparative study on 
the HIV policies, successes, and failures of these three coun-
tries suggests that, on the international level, border testing 
should be voluntary, confidential, informed, and coupled with 
both pre and post test counseling.267  These four procedures will 
ensure that basic autonomy is respected, that the risk of dis-
crimination is minimized, that individuals are aware of the 
risks of discrimination before testing, and that they receive the 
necessary information to deal with the disease and prevent 
spreading it to others. 
Moreover, this comparison clearly demonstrates that while 
such international policies are effective at decreasing the 
spread of HIV, the only way to truly put a dent in the disease’s 
spread is to attack it domestically as well by educating the pub-
lic and creating programs targeting the high-risk groups re-
sponsible for the rapid spread of HIV.268  These two domestic 
approaches are equally important because they educate people 
about how HIV is spread, directly target those who are proven 
to spread the disease the most, and lessen the risk of discrimi-
nation as there will be less misguided fear when people realize 
HIV does not spread by casual contact.  
In the end, it seems the only way to truly combat HIV is 
not to hide from the disease and/or treat it as a foreign prob-
lem, but rather to openly acknowledge HIV and the fundamen-
tal rights of those plagued with this disease.  In doing so, socie-
ty will find not only that it is more effectively protecting itself 
                                               
266 Medical Examination Removal, supra note 15, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56,550, 
56,555; UNAIDS & IOM INT’L ORG. for MIGRATION, supra note 1, at 5. 
267 See World Health Org. & UNAIDS, supra note 23, at 30; UNAIDS & 
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from the spread of HIV, but also that it is protecting the HIV 
community from the stigma and discrimination that initially 
contributed to the rapid spread of HIV. 
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